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Missouri River
1. INTRODUCTION
After the United States pur-
chased the Louisiana Territory from
France in 1803. the Missouri River
played a vital role in the develop-
ment of the American West. particu-
larly as a means for transporting
people, animals. and goods.' The
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers,
together with their tributaries, served
as natural traffic ways that connected
southern and eastern states to the
western frontier and helped tie a
young nation together. A little over
a century later, states within the Mis-
souri River basin would begin quar-
reling over utilization and manage-
ment of the river, and the river would
become a wedge between the states
in a sustained interstate dispute. This
dispute continues to loom over the
Missouri River basin and has
sparked analogous intrastate
struggles that, to date, have largely
been overshadowed and overlooked.
In the 1930s and 1940s. se-
vere flooding prompted Congress to
enact legislation authorizing the con-
struction of six mainstem dams
along the Missouri river. Generally,
the responsibility of managing the
river, including operation of the
dams and reservoirs authorized by
Congress, lies with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. The Corps of
Engineers is responsible for orches-
trating the release of flows from the
main stem reservoirs, and it manages
the river to produce benefits for vari-
ous purposes. including flood con-
trol, navigation, irrigation, hydro-
power. water supply. water quality,
recreation, and fish and wildlife re-
sources.2 Even before Congress au-
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thorized the construction of five of
the six mainstem dams and reser-
voirs, however, states within the
Missouri River basin had begun ar-
guing over the management of the
river.. Each state sought to protect
interests important to its citizenry
and campaigned to the federal gov-
ernment in an effort to influence the
federal government's plans for the
river. Upper basin states, including
Montana, North Dakota, and South
Dakota.' generally argued that the
river and its tributaries should be
developed to promote irrigation in-
terests in the northwestern range of
the basin. Lower basin states. in-
cluding Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and
Nebraska, fought to promote navi-
gation and flood control. The con-
flicting nature of the interests the
states sought to protect in this pre-
dam era incited a dispute over allo-
cation of water resources in the Mis-
souri River basin and management
of the river which endures to the
present. Even today, the interstate
dispute shows few signs of resolu-
tion. Ironically, perhaps, the very
river that, in the years after the Loui-
siana Purchase, helped bind a young
Vol. 5 + No. 3
America together now divides the
states within its basin.
For many years, represen-
tatives from the Missouri River ba-
sin states have attempted to recon-
cile their differences via countless
negotiations, but these talks have
done little to diffuse the situation.
Litigation among the states has
proven equally ineffective. Al-
though the Corps of Engineers has
made efforts in recent years to bet-
ter address and accommodate states'
interests in its operation of the river,s
it has consistently met with disap-
proval and criticism. In part, at least,
the elusiveness of resolution can be
blamed on the complexity of the
problem.6 The interests at issue are
not wholly matters of state concern.
Instead, many are matters of local,
regional, and interest-group concern.
Individual states have, themselves,
experienced tremendous difficulty
identifying and determining which
interests they should assert in the
interstate dispute. As a result, intr-
astate disputes-which reflect the
predominant interstate dispute-
have erupted. In this, the State of
Missouri is no exception.
The purposes of this Com-
ment are fourfold. First, it will of-
fer a brief history of the develop-
ment of the Missouri River and the
ensuing interstate dispute. Second,
it will briefly introduce legal limita-
tions on state and local governments
with respect to regulating and man-
aging federal navigable waters as
well as limitations imposed upon the
Corps of Engineers in its manage-
ment and operation of the river.
Third, it will discuss, in general, the
domestic interests of the State of
Missouri with regard to the use and
management of the river. Finally, it
will propose a goal of ascertaining,
examining, and weighing the vari-
ous interests of its people in order
to identify and promote the interest
or interests that, alone or in combi-
nation with one another, presump-
tively would yield optimum benefits
for Missouri.
II. HISTORY OF THE
MISSOURI RIVER AND THE
INTERSTATE QUARREL
A. 1800s to 1920s: Early History
of the River
The Missouri River's his-
tory is as rich as the soil lining its
banks,' and to fully appreciate and
understand the dispute surrounding
the Missouri River, it is important
to examine the river's past. Since
the United States acquired it from
France in 1803 as part of the Loui-
siana Purchase, the Missouri River
has been altered in many ways. The
changes have been implemented pri-
marily for purposes of navigation,
flood control, and, to a much lesser
extent, irrigation. It has been
straightened, shortened, deepened,
narrowed, and confined. These al-
terations have changed the dynam-
ics of the river in many respects,
some of which have become sub-
jects of debate within the Missouri
River basin. The biggest changes
along the river-particularly general
navigational improvements and the
construction of six mainstem reser-
voirs-merit discussion.
The basin drains some
529,350 square miles in the U.S. and
approximately 9715 square miles in
Canada.' The river is approximately
2316 miles long,9 winding from its
mouth near St. Louis, Missouri, to
its headwaters near Three Forks,
Montana, where it originates at the
confluence of the Gallatin,
Jefferson, and Madison Rivers.10
While pre-development records are
incomplete, the shortening of the
river has been well documented. In
1879, the river from Rulo, Ne-
braska, to its mouth was 544 miles."
In 1972, the same stretch was only
498.4 miles long." It should be
noted that the entire stretch between
Rulo and the mouth was
channelized, and most of the
channelization had been completed
by 1972.13 Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the river's shortened length
was accompanied by a drastic reduc-
tion in surface area. In its natural
s For example, the Corps has been investigating alternatives to its Master Control Manual for the past several years. See
generally MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., JoHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL 18-55 (1994).
7 See, e.g., CHARLES P. DEATHERAGE, STEAMBOATING ON THE MISSOURI RIVER IN THE SIXTIES (1924); HENRY C. HART, THE DARK
MISSOURI (1957); STANLEY VESTAL, THE MISSOURI (1945).
8 H.R. Doc. No. 238, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1934).
9 U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM, RESERVOIR REGULATION MANUAL, MASTER
MANUAL II-1 (1979) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL].
10 SeeA Chronology ofSelectedEvents in the Missouri River Basin, CoNE. PRoc.: THE PICK-SLOAN Mo. BASIN PLAN, August
10-11, 1983, ativ [hereinafterA Chronology].





state, the river was shallow and me-
andering, with abundant backwaters,
chutes, sloughs, oxbows, sandbars,
and islands.14 In 1879, the river's
total surface area was 121,739
acres.'5 By 1972, this area had been
reduced by roughly 50%, to fewer
than 61 thousand acres (not includ-
ing the mainstem reservoirs).'6
Early changes along the
Missouri River were intended to take
advantage of the river's expansive
reach and its potential for carrying
commerce. In the years following
the Louisiana Purchase, the Missouri
River hosted any number of brave
navigators who journeyed up and
dovn the river in small watercraft
such as canoes, mackinaws,
bullboats, and keelboats." While
these Missouri River pioneers un-
doubtedly carried goods and en-
gaged in trading up and dovn the
river, it was only after steamboats
first entered the river in 1819" that
people began to realize the river's
potential to support a significant
amount of commerce. By 1860,
steamboats moved as far upstream
as Fort Benton, Montana,19 but this
was accomplished only after years
of governmental efforts to improve
the river's navigability.
Prior to 1824, federal gov-
emnment officials desired to promote
navigation on all of the nation's wa-
terways, but national leaders of the
day questioned the federal
government's power to act in fur-
therance of that goal. In 1818, the
United States House of Representa-
tives passed a resolution in which it
declared Congress' power to appro-
priate money for the improvement
of the nation's water courses, 20 but
its bold statement lacked complete
conviction. There persisted some
degree of doubt as to whether Con-
gress' Constitutional powers ex-
tended to regulation of waterways.
Thus, while Congress proceeded to
enact legislation which appropriated
federal funds for the survey of the
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers in 1819
and 1820, it did little else to advance
its goal of increased navigation.2 '
This changed in 1824 when the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down a land-
mark decision in which it validated
Congress' power to directly regulate
navigable waters pursuant to its au-
thority to regulate commerce under
Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Con-
stitution.2 2 Later that year, Congress
embraced the Supreme Court's de-
cision by enacting the first River and
Harbor Act, which was described as
"an Act to improve the navigation
of the Ohio and Mississippi Riv-
ers." 2 3 Then, in 1832, Congress
authorized the President to extend
the provisions of the River and Har-
bor Act of 1824 to the Missouri
River.24 For several decades there-
after, the federal government inter-
mittently appropriated modest sums
of money to fund "examinations,
surveys, and reports; improvement
of navigation through removal of
[sand] bars, snags, wrecks, and other
obstructions; the protection of banks
at specified locations; and construc-
tion and repair of vessels, operating
equipment, and machinery required
for the work."2 s
Between the 1850s and
1880s, steamboat navigation flour-
ished on the Missouri River.2 6 Dur-
ing this period, roads and land ve-
hicles were inadequate for carrying
14 See Larry W. Hesse, Taming the Wild Missouri River: W17hat Has it Cost?, FISHERIES, March-April 1987, at 2.
I5 FUNK & ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 3.
16 I.
1 HIRAM M. CHITTENDEN, HISTORY OF EARLY STEAMBOAT NAVIGATION ON THE MISSOURI RIVER; LIFE & ADVENTURES OF JOSEPH LA
BARGE 91 (1962).
is Id. at 90.
19 WILLIAM E. LASS, A HISTORY OF STEAMBOATING ON THE UPPER MISSOURI RIVER 5 (1962). Although there are accounts of
small steamboats navigating the river above Fort Benton, for all intents and purposes, Fort Benton was the head of steamboat
navigation. Id. at 1, 5.
20 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1382-86 (1818) (15th Cong., 1st Sess.). See WILLIAM J. HULL & ROBERT W. HULL, THE ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERWAYS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1967).
21 JOHN R. FERRELL, SOUNDINGS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MISSOURI RIVER NAVIGATION PROJECT 5 (1996) [hereinafter
FERRELL, SOUNDINGS].
22 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 246 (1824). See also THORSON, supra note 6, at 56.
23 See River and Harbor Act of 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32 (1824); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
24 See River and Harbor Act of 1832, ch. 153, § 1, 4 Stat. 551, 552-53 (1832); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
25 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
26 FUNK & ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 8; Bert Schneiders, The Afyth of Environmental Aanagement: The Corps, the
Missouri River, and the Channelization Project, 70 AGRIC. HIST. 337, 338 (1996).
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significant commerce, and railroads
had not yet penetrated the entirety
of the Missouri River basin." As a
result, steamboats were the preferred
means of transportation for com-
merce in the Midwest. By the late
1860s and throughout the 1870s,
railroads rapidly expanded into the
Missouri River basin and began
competing with steamboats. 8 By
some accounts, wherever the rail-
road met the river, steamboat com-
merce essentially died downstream
from the railroad-river junction. 9
The steamboats-because of the
dangers the river continually posed
to boats and their crews, as well as
the steamboats' unpredictable
schedules and limited capacities to
carry cargo-simply could not coni-
pete.30 By 1869, the railroad ran
alongside the river from its mouth
at the Mississippi River to Sioux
City, Iowa.3 ' By the early 1880s, it
was clear that steamboat commerce




became monopolistic and domi-
nated commerce in the Midwest.33
Believing the railroads ivere unfair
and exploitative, residents of the
Missouri River basin began efforts
in 1880 to persuade the federal gov-
ernment to intervene and reestablish
commerce on the river in order to
compete with the railroads. The
basin residents' ultimate goal was to
create a competitive midwestern
shipping market that would reduce
shipping rates and stimulate the
economy of the entire region."
These proponents of river commerce
were aware, however, that steam-
boats would still be incapable of
competing with railroads, so they
also sought to develop deep-draft
barge navigation on the river.36 This
would require that the naturally shal-
low, sinuous, braided, and free-flow-
ing Missouri River be altered to de-
velop a deep, stable channel that
could accommodate the deep-draft
barges.3 1 Knowing that implemen-
tation of the plan would be expen-
sive, advocates asserted that "peg-
ging down" the river in a stable
channel and stabilizing the river's
banks would have benefits beyond
recreating river commerce. They
contended that a stabilized channel
and banks would increase property
values, reclaim land along the river,
and generate additional tax revenues
by adding reclaimed real estate to
property tax roles.
In 1881, the Army Corps of
Engineers joined the basin residents'
campaign to reestablish commerce
on the Missouri River. 9 The Corps
presented to Congress a plan pro-
posing a number of river improve-
ments which it believed would sta-
bilize the river as needed to accom-
plish the objectives of the basin resi-
dents.40 Congress appropriated
money to fund the Corps' plan in
1882.1 In a further step, Congress
created the Missouri River Connis-
sion in 1884 to oversee and direct
river improvements authorized by
Congress and to assess and develop
new plans to improve the river's
navigability. 42 The Commission
desired to implement a systematic
approach to the river's development,
and navigation improvements were
among the Commission's initial
goals in its plan for the river.43 In a
few short years, however, basin resi-
dents grew dissatisfied with the ef-
forts of the Corps and the Commis-
sion because they perceived the
Commission as overly focused on
developing the navigational channel,
27 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 338.
28 Id. at 338-39; FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 3.
29 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 338.
"o Id. at 338-39.
3 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 3.
32 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 339.
33 Id.
3 Id.; FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 21.
3 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 21.
36 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 339.
37 id.
38 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 21.
39Id.
4 Id at 9; FUNK & ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 8.
41 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra notc 21, at 21.
42 See River and Harbor Act of 1884, ch. 229, § 1, 23 Stat. 133, 144-45 (1884); A Chronology, supra note 10, at vii, viii.43 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 23.
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neglecting their other goals of bank
stabilization and land reclamation.44
To some extent, the basin residents'
focus had shifted from the common
goal of navigation-the furtherance
of which residents had anticipated
would produce incidental private
benefits-to goals that would yield
greater private benefits.45 To that
end, the residents lobbied Congress,
asking that it compel the Corps and
the Commission to diversify their
improvement efforts to include
projects that would produce such
benefits. 6 Consequently, during the
late 1880s and 1890s, Congress' ap-
propriations for river improvements
were largely ear-marked for projects
intended to benefit particular con-
stituencies and interest groups rather
than improvement of the river as a
whole. These appropriations se-
verely limited the Commission's
ability to implement systematic de-
velopment of the river as it desired,
and by 1900, the Commission called
for its own dissolution.48 Accord-
ingly, Congress abolished the Mis-
souri River Commission in 1902 and
transferred its duties and responsi-
bilities to the Corps of Engineers."
The net effect of the Mis-
souri River Commission's efforts
was a forty-five-mile stretch of im-
proved river, beginning approxi-
mately five miles above Jefferson
City, Missouri.50 Along that reach,
the river's width had been substan-
tially reduced, adding about 5500
acres of reclaimed land to property
tax roles and increasing the river's
depth to over six feet for the length
ofthe reach."
During the early 1900s, af-
ter the dissolution of the Missouri
River Commission, Congress dras-
tically curbed its appropriations for
construction of new improvements
on the river and made few appro-
priations for the maintenance of ex-
isting improvements." Still seeking
relief from high shipping costs and
monopolistic railroads, basin resi-
dents again formed interest groups
and lobbied Congress to continue
development of the river, chiefly for
navigation." Urban interests seek-
ing to develop navigation on the
river were bolstered by the unusual
and unexpected support of agricul-
tural interests in the lower basin,54
as the railroads had proven incapable
of efficiently shipping the increas-
ing supply of agricultural products,
resulting in waste and losses to farm-
ers." While agricultural and other
rural interests maintained their be-
lief that development of the river
would yield private benefits, navi-
gation prevailed as the predominant
interest.-
In 1910, Congress re-
sponded to the lobby by appropri-
ating $1 million to establish a per-
manent six-foot-deep, 200-foot-
wide navigational channel between
Kansas City, Missouri, and the
mouth of the Missouri River." In
1912, Congress appropriated an ad-
ditional $800 thousand in further-
ance of the project and expressed its
desire for the project to be com-
pleted within ten years." After
World War I erupted in 1914, how-
ever, Congress' appropriations
lagged and, as a result, the develop-
ment of the navigational channel did
not progress as quickly as ex-
pected." In 1915, the Corps of En-
gineers submitted a report to Con-
gress in which the Kansas City Dis-
trict Engineer recommended that the
project be scrapped because the fed-
' Id. at 24-26. Statements made by the Commission leave little doubt that improved navigation was, indeed, one of its
foremost goals. See, e.g., FUNK & RoBINsoN, supra note 1, at 8.
45 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 24.
4 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 26.
49 A Chronology, supra note 10, at viii.
50 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 25.
51 Id. at 25, 27.
52 Id. at 27.




5 See River and Harbor Act of 1910, ch. 382, § 1, 36 Stat. 630, 660 (1910); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 35.
58 See River and Harbor Act of 1912., ch. 253, § 1, 37 Stat. 201, 219 (1912); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 41.
' FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21. at 44.
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eral government was spending ap-
proximately $1.1 million per year to
save only about $10 thousand per
year in shipping costs.' Basin resi-
dents successfully fought to save the
project, but, before World War I
ended in 1918, Congress' appropria-
tions were nominal, at best.6' In ad-
dition, many of the Corps' resources
were rededicated elsewhere to aid in
the war effort.62 Not surprisingly,
progress on the navigational chan-
nel was severely limited.
B. 1920s to 1960s:
The Construction Boom
In the early to mid 1920s,
navigational interests once again
banded together and successfully
lobbied Congress for appropriations
to continue the channelization ef-
fort. 6 Persistent navigational inter-
ests won a major victory in 1927
when Congress authorized the Mis-
souri River Navigation and
Channelization Project, which
would extend the six-foot by 200-
foot navigational channel upstream
to Sioux City, Iowa.' The project
was destined to become one of the
most important elements in the
"physical and ecological transfor-
mation of the Missouri River."6 1 In
addition to this project, Congress
commissioned a study to determine
the feasibility of creating a nine-
foot-deep navigational channel from
the mouth of the river to Kansas
City.' Although authorization of the
Missouri River Navigation and
Channelization Project was a victory
for navigation advocates, Congress
failed to dedicate funding for the
project for subsequent years.
Conseq uently, interested
Congresspeople from the Midwest
were forced to seek renewed fund-
ing for the project annually.6 7 It was
not until Franklin Roosevelt as-
sumed the Presidency in March
1933 that the project received ad-
equate, steady funding." That oc-
curred when, during the Great De-
pression, President Roosevelt sought
to stimulate the economy by imple-
menting a number of federally
funded public-works projects pursu-
ant to the power Congress granted
him in the National Industrial Re-
covery Act of 1933 ("NIRA"). 69
Although the Missouri River Navi-
gation and Channelization Project is
not one for which President
Roosevelt is particularly well re-
membered, it served the same pri-
mary purpose as other, more popu-
lar public-works projects at the time.
That is, it provided jobs for unem-
ployed laborers.70  But the
channelization project also had other
purposes, most of which echoed the
objectives of the basin residents who
had sought to reestablish navigation
on the Missouri River in the 1880s.
National leaders believed develop-
ment of the river would spur eco-
nomic growth in the Midwest by
facilitating navigation and com-
merce on the river." They also be-
lieved that a stable river channel
would help prevent the erosive ac-
tion of the uncontrolled river,
thereby preserving the rich bottom-
land soil for agricultural and indus-
trial uses.' 2 Finally, they speculated
that a stable channel would improve
the value of real estate in the river
valley, which was thought to be de-
pressed by the constant threat of .
flooding and erosion."
During the 1930s and until
1941, the river downstream from
Sioux City was alive with activity.
Numbering in the thousands, work-
ers dredged the channel and con-
structed levees, rock revetments, and
wooden piling dikes. As the course
of the river began conforming to the
Corps' expectations, it appeared that
humans would ultimately tame the
6 Id.
61 Id at 46.
62 d
63 Id at 52.
6 See River and Harbor Act of 1927, ch. 47, § 1, 44 Stat. 1010, 1013 (1927) (adopting H.R. Doc. No. 1120, 60th Cong.,2d Sess. (1908)); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 54; Schneiders, supra note 26, at 340.65 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 337.
6 River and Harbor Act of 1927, supra note 64, § 4, 44 Stat. at 1020; FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 54.67 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 340.
68 Id.
69 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Schneiders, supra note 26, at 34041. The Act gave thePresident the power to authorize the construction of public-works projects "[w]ith a view to increasing employment quickly."National Industrial Recovery Act, supra, § 203(a), 48 Stat. at 202.






The river was busy up-
stream as well. In 1933, President
Roosevelt had formally approved a
plan to construct a dam across the
Missouri River in eastern Montana."
This project, which came to be
known as the Fort Peck Project,
would become the first of six dams
across the mainstem of the Missouri
River. While the project's immedi-
ate purpose was to create jobs, its
ultimate purposes were to provide
flood control and promote naviga-
tion.'6 The project's limited pur-
'poses would lead to discord in the
basin, however, as upper basin resi-
dents expected to gain irrigation
benefits from the Fort Peck Project
as well.
The nation's irrigation
needs had heretofore been provided
through the Bureau of Reclamation.
The Bureau's origins may be traced
back to over thirty years before
President Roosevelt approved the
Fort Peck Project when Congress,
in the Reclamation Act of 1902, au-
thorized the Secretary of the Interior
to administer programs designed to
develop water storage facilities
throughout the West." The Act
failed to designate a federal agency
to carry out the Secretary's pro-
grams, so the U.S. Geological
Survey's Division of Hydrography
was reorganized to form the Recla-
mation Service in order to imple-
ment the water storage programs."
In 1907, the Reclamation Service
became an independent agency un-
der the Department of the Interior,
and the familiar Bureau of Reclama-
tion was born. 9 The Bureau's pri-
mary responsibility was (and still is)
to construct and maintain irrigation
and water storage projects approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, and,
as early as 1903, the Secretary of the
Interior had approved significant ir-
rigation projects for the upper por-
tion of the Missouri River basin.80
These appropriations highlighted the
climatic differences between the
upper and lower basin states. In the
arid upper basin, farmers were
largely limited to producing live-
stock, wheat, and small grains.' In
the lower basin, where rainfall and
water supplies were generally ample,
farmers could produce a wide vari-
ety of crops as well as livestock.8
As a result, the upper basin states
tended to view water more as a com-
modity than did lower basin states.
Construction of the Fort Peck
Project made one thing clear: irri-
gation and navigation interests were
on a collision course.
When the Corps con-
structed the Fort Peck Project, there
were few, if any, plans to use water
stored in the reservoir to accommo-
date irrigation needs in the upper
basin.83 When this became evident,
upper basin interests argued fer-
vently that irrigation 'was one of the
project's express purposes, evi-
denced by the Public Works
Administration's inclusion of the
phrase "for water conservation"
among the stated purposes of the
project's first three fund alloca-
tions.84 However, lower basin inter-
ests countered with the fact that Con-
gress had ultimately omitted the
phrase from legislation which appro-
priated funds for the construction
and operation of the Fort Peck
Project.85 As it turned out, these ini-
74 FERRELL, SOUNDINGs, supra note 21, at 61.
7 JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA 5 (1993) [hereinafter FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA]. The plan was Public Works Project Number
30. Id. Section 202(b) of the NIRA limited the President's power to authorize public-works projects with regard to river and
harbor improvements by providing that no such improvements could be implemented "unless they shall have heretofore or
hereafter been adopted by the Congress or are recommended by the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army." In this
case, the dam was recommended by the Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army.
76 See H.R. Doc. No. 238, supra note 8 (incorporated into River and Harbor Act of 1935, ch. 831, § 1, 49 Stat. 1028, 1034
(1935)). House Document 238 was a Corps of Engineers' progress report on the development of the Missouri River. In
general, it described the Fort Peck Project as a flood-control and navigational improvement. H.R. Doc. No. 238, supra,
passim. But see FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 6-7.
7 Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093.,32 Stat. 388 (1902); Brian Morris, Unanswered Prayers: The Upper MissouriRiver
Basin States Take on the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, 68 N.D. L. REv. 897, 904 (1992).
78 Id.
7 Id.
80 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 3.
81 Morris, supra note 77, at 903.
82 Id.
8 FERRELL, BIG DA4 ERA, supra note 75, at 5.
4 Id.
85 Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tial debates only foreshadowed the
battles to come.
The Corps of Engineers
closed the Fort Peck Reservoir in
1937, and it was operational by
1940. However, the Corps was not
as fortunate with the Missouri River
Navigation and Channelization
Project, as United States' involve-
ment in World War II curtailed
progress on the project in 1941.86
During the War, Congress failed to
appropriate enough money to main-
tain existing improvemcnts; 7 essen-
tially, the project was on hold for the
duration of the war.
Nevertheless, the Corps had
managed to complete much of the
work on the channelization project,
and, even before the project was in-
terrupted by World War II, commer-
cial navigation had been restored to
the river.88 But in the early 1940s,
the river symptomatically demon-
strated a very unpleasant side-effect
of channelization: flooding. Histori-
cally, as the volume of water in the
channel increased during periods of
abundant precipitation, the river's
naturally wide, sinuous, and braided
bed would allow the water to expand
horizontally across the river, thereby
reducing the amount of water that
would otherwise overflow the river's
natural banks and spill out onto the
flood plain." Essentially, the river's
natural features served as built-in
flood-protection mechanisms. But
channelization and reclamation of
land along the narrowed river largely
eliminated the riverbed's horizontal,
flood-water buffer zone."0
In 1942 and 1943, flood
waters moved down the channelized
Missouri River, inundating the flood
plain and severely damaging prop-
erty and agricultural lands. 9' The
constrained river only exacerbated
the severity of flooding because the
narrower, channelized river moved
faster and caused higher-than-nor-
mal water levels in the flood plain.9 -
In 1943, extensive flooding
prompted the House of Representa-
tives to hold a special hearing of the
Flood Control Committee at which
Colonel Lewis A. Pick, the Division
Engineer of the Corps of Engineers'
Missouri River Division,93 made a
presentation. 94 Soon after the Flood
Control Committee's special hear-
ing, Congress passed a resolution in
which it asked the Corps to assess
the need for flood control on the
Missouri River.95 The Corps as-
signed the job to Colonel Pick."
By this time, Congress was
also preparing for a wave of eco-
nomic depression that leaders antici-
pated would envelop the country at
the close of World War II. As part
of its efforts to identify means to
spark economic growth, Congress
had instructed the Corps to create a
list of flood-control projects that it
believed should be implemented at
the end of World War II.9 To that
end, the Corps' Chief of Engineers
had directed Colonel Pick to make
a schedule of "worthy construction
projects" on the Missouri River.98
Consequently, by the time Colonel
Pick was assigned to respond to
Congress' new resolution regarding
flood control, he had already begun
the task of assessing construction
needs in the basin.
Colonel Pick believed that
limited-purpose projects, like the
Fort Peck Project," were unwork-
able because of their inherent con-
troversy and the difficulty of justi-
fying such enormous expense for a
limited benefit.'" Instead, Colonel
Pick desired to implement "a com-
prehensive plan of development for
the Missouri River valley that every
interested group of people [could]
support."' 01 In essence, he wanted
to develop a plan that considered and
accommodated all the prevalent
river interests to the greatest possible
86 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 343.
88 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 79.
89 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 343.
' Id. at 343-44.
9' Id. at 344.
92 Id.
9 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at
9 THORSON, supra note 6, at 63-64.
9 Id. at 64.
Id.
9 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 9.
98 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 6. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.






The "Pick Plan," as it was
called, emphasized flood control
and navigation, but also boasted
benefits for other interests as well,
including irrigation, power produc-
tion, domestic and industrial water
supplies, wildlife, and recreation.'0
In particular, the plan called for con-
struction of a deeper, wider naviga-
tional channel from the mouth of the
river to Sioux City, Iowa; develop-
ment of a series of levees along the
river below Sioux City; and, most
significantly, construction of five
massive mainstem dams and reser-
voirs.'o While the Pick Plan did
envision the production of some hy-
droelectric power, the dams it pro-
posed were designed primarily for
water retention, not power produc-
tion."' As a result, the plan com-
promised power production for
flood control. 0 The plan carried an
estimated price tag of $661 million,
which included the cost of the five
proposed dams and a number of
other projects that had already been
authorized.'06 The Pick Plan was not
the only one of its kind, however.
In 1939, two years after the
closure of the Fort Peck Project, the
Bureau of Reclamation had begun
generating its own plan for compre-
hensive development of the Mis-
souri River basin in accordance with
the Reclamation Project Act of
1939.107 The project was headed by
William Glenn Sloan, an assistant
engineer at the Bureau of
Reclamation's office in Billings,
Montana.i" When the Corps an-
nounced the Pick Plan, Sloan
worked hastily to complete the
Bureau's plan. 09 Known as the
"Sloan Plan," it emphasized irriga-
tion and reclamation interests and
called for construction of ninety
dams and rescrvoirs throughout the
upper basin." 0 The Bureau pro-
posed to offset the costs of the dams'
construction and operation by build-
ing seventeen power plants to pro-
duce hydroelectric power."' The
total cost of the plan was estimated
at $1.257 billion." 2
The stage had thus been set
for a political face-off between the
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
of Reclamation. In 1943, eight
states-Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Wyoming-or-
ganized the Missouri River States
Committee ("MRSC").'13 Colo-
rado and Minnesota later joined the
MRSC to form a powerful lobby of
Missouri River basin states.114 Al-
though the states' interests were di-
vergent, they each had an interest in
seeing the Missouri River basin's
vast water resources developed in
some way, and they realized that
they could have greater influence in
Washington, D.C. by pooling their
efforts."' In February 1944, the
Corps submitted the Pick Plan to
Congress.' 1 6 The plan quickly
gained strong committee support in
the House of Representatives and
was incorporated into the flood-con-
trol bill eventually passed by the
House."' In May of the same year,
the Bureau presented Congress with
the Sloan Plan." After its introduc-
tion, the flood-control bill, which
had passed earlier in the House, was
102 H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); Morris, supra note 77, at 908-09.
103 See H.R. Doc. No. 475, supra note 102; Morris, supra note 77, at 908. These were not all the projects proposed in the
Pick Plan, but they were the most significant.
104 Morris, supra note 77, at 910.
105 Id.
106 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64-65.
1o7 Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9, 53 Stat. 1187, 1193-94 (1939) (requiring that all such plans submitted to
Congress contain particular information). THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
108 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
109 Morris, supra note 77, at 909.
110 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
i1" Id.
" Id. at 64, 66.
113 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 11.
114 Id.
us Id. at 10-11.
116 H.R. Doc. No. 475, supra note 102, at v; John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REv. 346, 358 (1985).
11 H.R. 4485, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
" S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); Guhin, supra note 116, at 359.
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stalled in the Senate when the Na-
tional Reclamation Association
("NRA") lobbied against it."'9 The
NRA backed the Sloan Plan, as did
the Department of the Interior and
most governors and Congresspeople
from the West. 12 0 With deadlock ap-
pearing eminent, the MRSC and
governors of the basin states issued
strong appeals to President
Roosevelt and Congress, asking that
they encourage the Corps of Engi-
neers and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion to compromise and develop a
single plan for comprehensive de-
velopment of the Missouri River.12'
Feeling pressure to reconcile their
plans, the Corps and the Bureau
hammered out a compromise, the
so-called "Pick-Sloan Plan," in
which the two agencies essentially
agreed to build all the projects they
had proposed.' 22 This synthesized
plan was presented in Senate Docu-
ment 247' 1and was incorporated by
reference in § 9 of the Flood Con-
trol Act of 1944.124
At the same time Congress
was struggling with the Pick and
Sloan Plans, it was considering a
new river and harbor bill that would
authorize the Corps of Engineers to
construct a permanent nine-foot-
deep, 300-foot-wide navigational
channel from the mouth of the Mis-
souri River to Sioux City, Iowa.125
Upper basin interests were con-
cerned that the existing six-foot-
deep, 200-foot-wide navigational
channel might have already vested
a right in lower basin states to suffi-
cient flow to maintain the six-foot
depth.'26 As a result, upper basin in-
terests seized the Pick-Sloan com-
promise as an opportunity to protect
their existing water interests from
acquisition by lower basin states in
the event the nine-foot-deep naviga-
tional channel was authorized and




to the Flood Control Act of 1944,
which provided that water used for
navigational purposes would be lim-
ited to "such use as does not con-
flict with any beneficial consump-
tive use, present or future, in States
lying wholly or partly west of the
ninety-eighth meridian, of such wa-
ters for domestic, municipal, stock
water, irrigation, or industrial pur-
poses."128 The river and harbor bill
was enacted into law in 1945, and,
as expected, it authorized the con-
struction of a nine-foot by 300-foot
navigational channel from the mouth
of the Missouri River to Sioux City,
a project known as the Missouri
River Navigation and Bank Stabili-
zation Project.129
Both the Flood Control Act
of 1944 and the River and Harbor
Act of 1945 were generic legislation
designed to deal with issues con-
fronting the entire nation. Conse-
quently, neither Act provided details
regarding the implementation of the
Pick-Sloan Plan. After negotiations
between the Corps and the Bureau
in 1949, the two agencies agreed that
whichever agency constructed and
subsequently maintained a particu-
lar project would retain primary re-
sponsibility for its operation with
regard to all uses other than flood
H19 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
120 id.
121 Guhin, supra note 116, at 362; Edward Weinberg, The Birth Pangs ofPick-Sloan, 1983 CoNF. PROC.: THE PICK-SLOAN
MissouRi BASIN PLAN 13, 22.
122 THORSON, supra note 6, at 67. Another significant factor compelling the Corps and the Bureau to forge a compromise
was the introduction of a bill that called for the creation of a Missouri Valley Authority-which would resemble the existing
Tennessee Valley Authority-to oversee the development of the Missouri River basin. Guhin, supra note 116, at 362. After
the MRSC's appeal to Congress and President Roosevelt, the President drafted a letter to Congress in which he endorsed the
Missouri Valley Authority concept. Id. Presumably, the Corps and the Bureau realized that the creation of a Missouri Valley
Authority would effectively displace both agencies in the development and operation of the Missouri River. Id.
123 S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
124 Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 887, 891 (1944); THORSON, supra note 6, at 67.
125 H.R. 3961, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); THORSON, supra note 6, at 69. The nine-foot by 300-foot navigational channel
was originally part of the Pick Plan, but was not incorporated into the flood-control bill. Instead, Congress included the
provision in the river and harbor bill because, traditionally, authorizations for navigational channel improvements had been
the province of River and Harbor legislation.
126 THORSON, supra note 6, at 69.
127 Id.
128 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1(b), 58 Stat. at 889.
129 River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10 (1945). The O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment was also incorporated
into the River and Harbor Act of 1945. River and Harbor Act of 1945, supra, § 1(b), 59 Stat. at 11.
126 MELPR
Missouri River
control and irrigation.130 In two
separate subsections of the Flood
Control Act of 1944, Congress ap-
propriated $200 million to each of
the two agencies.'3 1 Despite the
evenhandedness of this initial appro-
priation, after the Corps closed the
Sharpe Reservoir-the last of the
mainstem reservoirs to be closed-
in 1963, funding for new construc-
tion became scarce."' The Bureau
was then unable to construct a sig-
nificant number of the irrigation
projects authorized by the Flood
Control Act of 1944.'"1 Promises
to upper basin interests rang hollow,
and hostilities intensified.
In 1967, the Corps began
operating all six of the mainstem
reservoirs as a system.134 Although
the Fort Peck Project had originally
been approved by President
Roosevelt as a public-works project
pursuant to the NIRA, Congress sub-
sequently "authorized" the project
by appropriating additional funds
needed to complete its construction
in the River and Harbor Act of
1935.135 Later, in the Fort Peck
Power Act of 1938, Congress autho-
rized the Corps to construct and op-
erate hydropower facilities at the
Fort Peck Project site.136 Then, in
keeping with its newly-adopted
comprehensive approach to manage-
ment of the Missouri River basin for
multiple purposes, Congress autho-
rized the Corps to manage the Fort
Peck Dam and Reservoir for mul-
tiple purposes in the Flood Control
Act of 1944.'13 Finally, Congress
authorized the Corps to operate the
facility as part of the system of res-
ervoirs that would be created on the
mainstem of the Missouri River af-
ter construction of the five new
mainstem reservoirs authorized in
the Act.3
C. 1960s to Present:
The Interstate Dispute Matures
Over the next several de-
cades, for a number of reasons, the
Corps found itself in a constant tug
of war between upper and lower
basin interests. Although some of
the Bureau's projects were eventu-
ally built, the Corps had managed
to construct far more of its own
projects, and, by virtue of the agree-
ment between the Corps and Bureau
regarding which agency would con-
struct and operate the different
projects, the Corps had far more
operational control over the river. In
particular, the Corps' operation of
the mainstem dams became a focus
of debate. As evidenced by the his-
tory above, prior to construction of
the mainstem reservoirs, the upper
basin states fought primarily to pro-
tect their irrigation and reclamation
interests. While the upper basin's
efforts for irrigation were thwarted,
all was not lost. After the reservoirs
were closed, the irrigation and rec-
lamation interests shifted to a newly
discovered and very significant in-
terest: recreation. At normal pool
elevation, the reservoirs covered 990
thousand acres of land with water 39
and created recreational opportuni-
130 FERRELL, BIG DAm ERA, supra note 75, at 123; Morris, supra note 77, at 912. This arrangement apparently had been
contemplated by the Bureau while drafting the Sloan Plan. See S. Doc. No. 191, supra note 118, at 11 ("The agency with
primary interest in the dominant function of any feature proposed in the plan should construct and operate that feature, giving
full recognition, in the design, construction, and operation, to the needs of other agencies with minor interests"). Moreover,
in its comments on the Pick Plan, the Bureau stated that the "main-stem reservoirs. . .because of their peculiarly close
relationship with flood control and navigation below Sioux City, should be constructed, operated and maintained by the
Corps of Engineers." H.R. Doc. No. 475, supra note 102, at 7. However, the Bureau did expect to retain power over "any
feature [in a Corps-constructed and -operated dam and reservoir] in which the functions of irrigation, restoration of surface
and groundwater levels, and power are dominant." Id.
131 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 9(d) and (e), 58 Stat. at 891.
132 Morris, supra note 77, at 912.
133 Id.
134 The six mainstem dams and their respective reservoirs are the Fort Peck Dam and Lake, the Garrison Dam and Lake
Sakakawea, the Oahe Dam and Lake, the Big Bend Dam and Lake Sharpe, the Fort Randall Dam and Lake Francis Case, and
the Gavins Point Dam and Lewis and Clark Lake. See MASTER MANUAL REvIEw AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-1 to 1-
2.
1' See River and Harbor Act of 1935, supra note 75, § 1, 49 Stat. at 1034 (1935) (calling for the "completion of improve-
ment from mouth to Sioux City, Iowa, and construction of Fort Peck Dam").
136 Act of May 18, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-529, 52 Stat. 403.
137 This was part of the Pick-Sloan Plan incorporated into the Flood Control Act of 1944. See S. Doc. No. 247, supra note
123, at 2. Interestingly, the Plan called for Fort Peck to "be operated as a multiple-purpose reservoir primarily in the interest
of irrigation." Id.
138 This, too, was part of the Pick-Sloan Plan. See S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 2.
139 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-1.
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ties the upper basin states had not
fully anticipated. In part, at least,
the upper basin states embraced the
recreational benefits because many
of the projects outlined in the Pick-
Sloan Plan that had been intended
to benefit upper basin interests (i.e.,
projects originally proposed by the
Bureau in the Sloan Plan) never
came to fruition. Understandably,
the upper basin states believed the
lower basin states and the Corps of
Engineers owed them something,
and they expected payback in the
form of recognition of the impor-
tance of recreation to the upper ba-
sin.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the
recreational interests-like the irri-
gation and reclamation interests they
displaced-were at odds with the
navigational interests of the lower
basin states. Productive and useful
upper basin reservoirs required
stable water levels to benefit fish and
wildlife and to optimize recreational
opportunities,140 while navigation on
the lower river depended on suffi-
cient water releases from the reser-
voirs to maintain certain minimum
depths in the navigational channel.14 1
In times of sufficient precipitation
throughout-the basin, the reservoir
water levels were not greatly af-
fected, and the debate was largely
academic.
In fact, during the 1970s
and early 1980s when precipitation
was adequate, active debate centered
not on how limited water resources
should be allocated between upper
and lower basin interests but on how
"surpluses" of water in the reser-
voir could be used.142 Section 6 of
the Flood Control Act of 1944 au-
thorized the Secretary of the Army
to enter into contracts for the sale of
surplus water to states, political sub-
divisions, private concerns, and in-
dividuals." 3 Hoping to capitalize on
water surpluses in the early 1980s,
upper basin states seriously consid-
ered proposals to sell surplus water
to various potential users. Among
the proposed sales was a deal in
which the State of South Dakota
would sell 50,000 acre-feet of wa-
ter per year for forty years from Lake
Oahe in South Dakota to Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc.
("ETSI")."14 ETSI intended to use
the water to transport coal to states
outside the Missouri River basin in
a coal slurry pipeline.145 The plan
proved controversial even within
South Dakota' 4 6 and was hotly con-
tested by lower basin states. Never-
theless, after the South Dakota Con-
servancy District issued a permit to
ETSI authorizing it to use water for
the stated purpose, the Secretary of
the Interior entered into a contract
with ETSI which would allow ETSI
to withdraw water from Lake Oahe
to be used in accordance with its deal
with South Dakota. '4  Missouri,
joined by Iowa and Nebraska, filed
suit in federal district court to en-
join performance of the contract.148
The three lower basin states alleged
that the Secretary of the Interior's ac-
tions were ultra vires under the terms
of the Flood Control Act of 1944.149
The district court found that the Sec-
retary of the Interior neither con-
structed nor maintained the Oahe
Dam and Reservoir as an irrigation,
reclamation, or power project,'5 0
and, as a result, concluded that the
Secretary had no authority to enter
into contracts that authorized the
withdrawal of water from Lake
Oahe and entered judgment in the
plaintiffs' favor, permanently en-
joining performance of the con-
tract."' ETSI appealed the decision,
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.5 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the
issue, whether the Secretary of the
Interior's actions were beyond the
authority Congress granted the Sec-
retary in the Flood Control Act of
1944,'" and the Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit's decision.'54
140 See id, supra note 2, at 1-3.
141 See id.
142 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 147.
143 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 6, 58 Stat. at 890.
'4 Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F.Supp. 1268, 1272 (D. Neb. 1984).
1s Id.
146 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 153.
147 Andrews, 586 F.Supp. at 1271-72.
148 See generally Andrews, 586 F.Supp. 1268.
4 Id. at 1272.
"0 Id. at 1273-74.
'51 Id at 1280.
152 Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 287 (8th Cir. 1986).
s5 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 499 (1988).
'- Id at 517.
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In its decision, the Court
examined five provisions of the
Flood Control Act of 1944 that it
believed defined the jurisdictions of
the Corps and Bureau with respect
to projects authorized by and con-
structed pursuant to the Act." The
Court noted that Lake Oahe had
been constructed, maintained, and
operated by the Corps, and that ac-
cording to the express terms of the
Act, "such reservoirs are 'under the
control of' or 'under the direction
of' the Army Secretary.""5 6 Thus,
the Secretary of the Interior had no
power to authorize the withdrawal
of water from the Oahe, or any other
Corps-constructed, -maintained, and
-operated reservoir."' The Court's
interpretation of the Act was, per-
haps inadvertently, in accordance
with the 1949 "understanding" be-
tween the Corps and the Bureau in
which the agencies agreed that
whichever agency constructed and
maintained a project pursuant to the
Act would assume primary opera-
tional responsibility for the project.
In a sense, the Court's decision vali-
dated the legality of that agreement
and extended it to grant the Corps
exclusive control of projects over
which the Corps has assumed pri-
mary operational responsibility.
More importantly, the Court's deci-
sion appeared to vest a great deal of
power and responsibility to the
Corps of Engineers over the man-
agement of water resources in the
Missouri River basin since the Corps
constructed, maintained, and oper-
ated all six of the mainstem reser-
voirs as well as a significant num-
ber of projects on the river's tribu-
taries.
In contrast to the surplus is-
sues that had prevailed a decade be-
fore, water resources were limited
between 1987 and 1992, when the
basin experienced a long, incapaci-
tating drought.'5 8 The drought
aroused passions about the manage-
ment of the river and fueled the dis-
pute between upper and lower ba-
sin states. Suddenly, the debate over
limited water resources was more
than academic. The issues were very
real.
The Corps of Engineers'
management practices were at the
heart of the dispute. Not surpris-
ingly, the upper basin states fought
hard to curtail the amount of water
being released from the reservoirs
for downstream navigational pur-
poses. And, as expected, lower ba-
sin states demanded that the Corps
operate the mainstem reservoir sys-
tem to maintain navigation. The
Corps asserted, however, that it had
very little discretion to choose be-
tween the various interests because
its drought management practices
were governed by its Missouri River
Mainstem Reservoir System, Reser-
voir Regulation Manual, Master
Manual ("Master Manual"), which
established the priorities for man-
agement of the river during periods
of drought. Because navigation was
among the priorities declared in the
Master Manual, the Corps released
sufficient water to maintain naviga-
tion for as much of the regular navi-
gation season as possible.' As a
result, reservoir water levels
dropped to their lowest points since
the system had begun operating in
1967.'6 Faced with basin-wide
backlash for its drought manage-
ment practices, the Corps responded
by initiating a review of the Master
Manual.' 6'
As a general matter, the
Master Manual guides the Corps'
operation of the mainstem system on
the Missouri River.162 The Corps
first prepared the manual in 1960
and subsequently revised it in 1973,
1975, and 1979.163 The Master
Manual describes the Corps' oper-
ating philosophy and outlines basic
objectives for "optimum fulfill-
ment" of the goals for the mainstem
dams and reservoirs. '4 Day-to-day
operations of the system are gov-
erned by the Corps' Annual Oper-
ating Plan, which is based on the
guidelines set forth in the Master
Manual.
Early in the drought, vari-
ous river interests attacked the
Corps' operational guidelines as set
out in the Master Manual, and, in
November 1989, the Corps began
reevaluating the Master Manual. 65
Since that time, the Corps has been
1' Id. at 503-05.
i16 Id. at 505.
157 Id.
158 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-3.
'5 Id. During the drought, the navigation seasons were, in fact, shorter than normal. Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1-1.
163 Id.
'6 MASTER MANUAL, supra note 9., at 1-1.
165 MASTER MANuAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-3.
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engaged in a study to review and if existing constraints will allow.169  presented many groups with an op-
update the Master Manual and to After complcting several portunity to urge the Corps to adopt
select a preferred alternative to re- phases of the study, the Corps iden- a plan that will protect their inter-
place the current Master Manual.166  tified a number of public concerns ests. This has included many inter-
Although this author believes that regarding the operation of the est groups that heretofore have not
criticism during the drought was the mainstem system.'7  Considering been particularly active in the inter-primary reason for the Corps' initi- the foregoing history of the river, it state dispute. Missouri's interest
ating its review of the Master was no surprise that flood control, groups are no exception. While cer-
Manual, the Corps emphasized sev- navigation, and recreation were tam Missouri interest groups, most
eral factors in addition to the drought among the interests most ardently notably navigational and agricultural
as influencing its decision' 6  Pri- advocated. Other predominant con- groups, have traditionally dominated
marily, the Corps asserted that cems included the practice of sacri- Missouri's voice in the interstate dis-
changed circumstances-in particu- ficing other beneficial uses to meet pute, theirs are not the only interests
lar, changes in public attitudes to- hydropower demands; maintaining promoted by Missouri citizens. In
ward and increased awareness of the minimum flows in dam tailwaters; fact, many groups in Missouri are
"importance of recreation and the effects of operations on the national, opposed to the traditional naviga-
environment" 
-since the imple- regional, and local economies; tional interests the State ofMissouri
mentation of the original Master shoreline erosion on the reservoirs; has advocated the past several de-
Manual motivated it to commence fish and wildlife, especially endan- cades. These conflicting interests
the study to reconsider its regula- gered species; wetlands; effects of will be developed more fully below.
tions.'" In its study, the Corps has releases on lower channel configu- At this point, it is sufficient to un-
sought to [s]olicit input from inter- ration (because channel configura- derstand that the foregoing history
ested parties and determine public tion affects navigation, fish and of river development and interstate
concerns/issues; [i]dentify alterna- wildlife habitat, wetlands, etc.); dispute is the stage on which
tives to the current Water Control lower river icing (because icing af- Missouri's intrastate dispute has and
Plan; [e]stablish a basis for identi- fects domestic and industrial water will be played out.
fying the plan that best meets the supplies, channel configuration, fish
wide variety of contemporary needs and wildlife habitat, flooding, etc.); 111. LEGAL AND OPERA-
served by the Mainstem System; public safety; water supplies (both TIONAL CONSIDERATIONS[e]valuate social, economic, and en- in the reservoirs and along the river); An already complex prob-
vironmental impacts of existing and and water quality"' As may be len has been further complicAted by
alternative plans; [a]ddress legal seen, many concerns are interrelated, the entanglement of legal issues sur-
constraints on changes to operations; which contributes to the Corps' rounding it. Although a complete[o]btain the input of the basin States' problem of developing a universally analysis of the legal framework sur-
governors, the Indian tribes, and satisfactory management plan. rounding the development and man-
other interested parties; [ildentify the The Corps has not con- agenent of the Missouri River is not
best plan for operating the Mainstem pleted its study, but it has made sig- warranted by this Comment,' 7" there
System; and [e]xpedite the process nificant progress toward selecting an are a few legal particulars worthy of
to allow early implementation of alternative water control plan. The brief discussion. These include the
recommended operational changes, Corps' review and update study has limitations on state and local gov-
" Id. at 1-3 to 1-4.
167 Id at 1-3.
68 Id Others have recognized changes in circumstances concerning demands for and issues surrounding water in theMissouri Riverbasin. See, e.g., Warren Viessman, Jr., Changing ther Needs and Issues in the issouriRiver Basin, 1983CoNw. PROC.: THE PICK-SLOAN MisSOuRI BASIN PLAN 54.169 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATEDEIS, supra note 2, at 1-3 to 1-4.
170 Ida at 1-5.
171 id
172 For more thorough treatment, seeUNIVERSITY on MO. - COLUBIA SCHOOL OF LAW, MISSORI RVERtFLooD PLAIN LEGAL ANDINSTITUrIONAi FRAmwopK s-rumy (198 1); Guiin, supra note 116; Gene Olson, The 0m ahone-illikenAmendents: Thelest Sinks the Ncigateon Power, 65 N.D. L. REv. 91 (1989).
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ernments with respect to federal
navigable waters and the restraints
imposed upon the Army Corps of
Engineers in its management and
operation of the Missouri River.
A. Limitations on State and Lo-
cal Governments
Under the Supremacy
Clause of the federal Constitution,
the rights and powers of state and
local governments are limited by the
federal government's power with
respect to federally navigable wa-
ters.'" In Gibbons v. Ogden,'7 4 the
Supreme Court affirmed Congress'
power to directly regulate navigation
on navigable waters pursuant to its
power to regulate interstate com-
merce. Since Gibbons, the Supreme
Court has spent considerable time
delineating Congress' so-called
"navigation" power over navigable
waters. The Court has defined navi-
gable waters to include all interstate
waterways that have been used for
1" U.S. CONST. art. VI.







commercial interstate navigation in
the past;'" those that could have
been used for commercial interstate
navigation in the past had reasonable
improvements been made (whether
or not they could presently be
made);'1 6 those that are presently
being used for commercial interstate
navigation;'" those that are presently
capable of being used for commer-
cial interstate navigation if reason-
able improvements are made;" and
those that otherwise could be used
for commercial interstate navigation
in the future."' In addition, Con-
gress can regulate activities on non-
navigable tributaries if those activi-
ties adversely impact the navigable
capacity of navigable waters'80 or
otherwise affect interstate com-
merce." Congress' navigation
power includes the authority to ex-
ercise control over both navigable
and nonnavigable waters for pur-
poses of navigation."' As a result,
Congress may authorize construc-
tion of projects designed to enhance
navigation.18 Likewise, it is within
Congress' power to authorize con-
struction of projects that will ob-
struct navigation.'" This is true even
if the project will effectively destroy
the navigable nature of a water-
way.'85 When confronted with Con-
gressional authorizations of mul-
tiple-purpose projects, the Supreme
Court held that so long as naviga-
tion was one of the purposes for a
project-essentially, no matter how
trivial-such projects were valid ex-
ercises of Congress' navigation
power.'86
One particularly significant
derivation from the navigation
power has been the navigation ser-
vitude, which the Supreme Court
first formally recognized in Gibson
v. United States." Briefly stated,
the navigation servitude permits the
federal government to impair or in-
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871); Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377.
The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874);,Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377.
Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377.
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). This is a proper exercise of Congress'
navigation power. See id.
181 FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965). This is not an exercise of Congress' navigation power but of its power to
regulate interstate commerce generally. See id.
182 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713 (1865); Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(holding that Congress can exercise control over nonnavigable waters in order to improve the navigable capacities of navi-
gable waters).
183 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
18 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
185 See id.
186 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). Furthermore, Congress' designation of a project as a navigation improve-
ment enjoys a presumption that Congress is making a valid exercise of its navigation power. See United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
187 166 U.S. 269 (1897). Although the navigation servitude is a derivative of Congress' navigation power, the two are not
coextensive in application. The navigation power extends to all navigable waters as well as nonnavigable tributaries on
which activity may impact the navigable capacity of navigable waters, but the navigation servitude generally does not extend
to nonnavigable waters. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266 (1943), remanded 138 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 773 (1944); United Statesv. Kansas City Life Ins.
Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). But see United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960) (overruled in part by the
River and Harbor Act of 1970, § I11, Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818, 1821 (1970)).
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terfere with private property rights
in the water of and land riparian to
navigable vaterways without incur-
ring liability for compensation un-
der the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Essentially, the fed-
eral government's navigation power
vests the federal government with
dominant rights in the water of and
the land riparian to navigable waters.
These federal rights constitute a ser-
vitude on private owners' titles to
the land and water. Thus, federal
activities that impair or interfere with
certain private property rights tradi-
tionally regarded as Constitutionally
protected are not necessarily pro-
tected if the government's activities
are valid exercises of the federal
government's navigation power over
navigable waterways. For example,
the Supreme Court has refused to
order compensation when the fed-
eral government has destroyed ac-
cess to navigable waterways,"'
when it has required bridge owners
to change the elevations of
bridges,'8 9 when it has constructed
or ordered abatement of structures
on the beds of navigable waters,'"
and when it has destroyed oyster
beds.'9 ' Most importantly, for pur-
poses ofthis Comment, the Supreme
Court has specifically held that the
federal government is not required
to pay compensation when it de-
stroys state-created water rights in
navigable waters.'" Consequently,
state water rights in navigable wa-
ters are subservient to the federal
government's power over navigable
waters.
By virtue of the Supremacy
Clause,'19 Congress' commerce and
navigation powers effectively trump
state and local attempts to regulate
navigable waters or commerce
thereon. Because the Missouri River
is a navigable waterway under the
test set out above,' 94 the federal gov-
emnient effectively controls the river
and a significant number of its tribu-
taries. This control forces states to
work with the federal government
in order to protect their interests in
navigable waterways.
B. Restraints on the Army Corps
of Engineers
In the Flood Control Act of
1944, Congress authorized construc-
tion of the projects proposed in the
Pick-Sloan Plan by making refer-
ence to Senate Document 247,
which embodied the Corps/Bureau
compromise. 95 Most significantly,
for purposes of this Comment, the
Pick-Sloan Plan called for the con-
struction of five new mainstem dams
and reservoirs on the Missouri River
and directed that the existing Fort
Peck facility be operated in conjunc-
tion with the five new projects after
they were constructed.'" The Act
declared a number of Congressional
policies, two of which are particu-
larly pertinent to this Comment:
[I]t is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Congress
to recognize the interests
and rights of the States in
determining the develop-
ment of the watersheds
within their borders and
likewise their interests and
rights in water utilization
and control, as herein au-
thorized to preserve and
protect to the fullest pos-
sible extent established and
potential uses, for all pur-
poses, of the waters of the
Nation's rivers; [and] to fa-
cilitate the consideration of
projects on a basis of com-
prehensive and coordinated
development.'
This passage evinces, first,
Congress' desire to establish a com-
prehensive plan for the development
of the nation's water resources and,
second, its intent to respect the
188 See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141(1900); United States . Commo-dore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
189 See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194 (1911);
Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917).
'9 See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941). But see Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); United States v.Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900) (both holding that compensation will be ordered unless Congress' authori-zation of the obstruction is express and unqualified). See also Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S.82(1913).
'9' Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
'92 Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
193 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
'9 See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377; see also supra text accompanying notes 175-179.
1 See supra notes 123-24.
19 S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 2-3.
i9 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1, 58 Stat. at 888.
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states' rights and interests in water
resources within their borders. The
Pick-Sloan Plan clearly envisioned
construction of numerous multiple-
use projects that would be operated
to achieve "maximum benefits for
flood control, irrigation, navigation,
power, domestic and sanitary pur-
poses, wildlife, and recreation."W98
The Flood Control Act, in contrast,
did not expressly state all its pur-
poses, although it clearly designated
flood control, navigation, and irri-
gation as its principal purposes.1"
Equally apparent, however, is that
the Act's purposes are not limited
to just flood control, navigation, and
irrigation. In Section 4, for example,
the Act authorizes the Corps of En-
gineers "to construct, maintain, and
operate public park and recreational
facilities in reservoir areas under the
control of the War Department.""2 1
This provision strongly suggests that
development of recreational oppor-
tunities was also an intended pur-
pose of the Act. However, it is un-
clear whether Congress' referential
incorporation of the Pick-Sloan Plan
in the Flood Control Act of 1944 ef-
fectively incorporated the purposes
stated in the Pick-Sloan Plan with
respect to the projects therein out-
lined. Regardless, the Corps of En-
gineers has essentially adopted the
purposes advanced in the Pick-Sloan
Plan for its operation and manage-
ment of the Missouri River
Mainstem Reservoir System."' In
a sense, the recognition of these
multiple purposes limits the Corps'
ability to manage the mainstem sys-
tem freely. Because all of the
mainstem projects were designated
as multi-purpose facilities, it would
appear to violate the Act for the
Corps to manage the system to the
exclusion of any of the identified
purposes, particularly if one believes
the Flood Control Act of 1944 did,
in fact, incorporate the purposes ex-
pressed in the Pick-Sloan Plan. If
correct, this limitation is significant
because it obligates the Corps to ac-
commodate-to some extent, at
least-the competing interests asso-
ciated with each of those purposes.
It is also significant that
Congress declared a policy of giv-
ing consideration to states' rights
and interests because it forces the
Corps, at least perfunctorily, to con-
sult the states affected by its man-
agement and operation of the Mis-
souri River and to consider the im-
pacts of its operations on states'
rights and interests.202 Such an un-
equivocal expression of Congres-
sional policy might be construed as
a mandate. Thus, the Corps likely
cannot refuse to consider the rights
and interests of or to involve states
in the planning and decision-mak-
ing process regarding management
of the river. Generally, the Corps
has consulted with and accepted the
involvement of the affected states in
its planning and management of the
Missouri River,203 but it is worth
noting that it cannot now choose to
disregard the various states' rights
and interests in that process.
Furthermore, the Corps'
management of the mainstem reser-
voir system is limited by other fed-
eral laws, such as the National En-
vironmental Policy Act
("NEPA")20 4 and the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA").205 An exten-
sive discussion of all federal laws
limiting the Corps' ability to freely
operate the system, however, is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. It
suffices here to recognize that the
Corps does not enjoy unfettered dis-
cretion in its management of the
Missouri River.
198 S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 5.
i9 See Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1, 58 Stat. at 887-89.
200 Id. at § 4, 58 Stat. at 889-90.
201 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-1 ("These projects were constructed and are operated and
maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ... on the Missouri River for flood control, navigation, irrigation, hydro-
power, water supply, water quality control, recreation, and fish and wildlife."). This is particularly significant since courts
generally give deference to an administering agency's interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S.
569 (1992); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202 See Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1(a), 58 Stat. at 888 (mandating that the Corps share certain
information regarding all future plans and/or proposed projects with the states that would be affected thereby and give those
states an "opportunity for consultation" with respect to such future plans and proposed projects; the provision does not
apply to works authorized by the Act but to all future "plans, proposals, or reports" that the Corps submits to Congress).
203 Note, the Corps maintains all decision-making authority, but it gives states the opportunity to participate in the process.
204 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969).
205 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L.. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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IV. MISSOURI'S INTERESTS
IN THE MISSOURI RIVER
As a State, Missouri is di-
vided by various interest groups pro-
moting different, and to some ex-
tent, conflicting interests in the man-
agement of the Missouri River.206
The principal interests asserted by
these groups are flood control, navi-
gation, fish and wildlife, recreation,
and domestic and industrial water
supply (including water quality).
With such a wide range of concerns,
perhaps not surprisingly, Missouri
has not uniformly advocated any
particular interests in the interstate
river management dispute. 'While
certain interest groups have domi-
nated Missouri's voice in the inter-
state dispute, other groups have also
sought to participate, though gener-
ally assuming limited roles and act-
ing almost as independent parties to
the Missouri River dispute rather
than representatives of the people of
the State of Missouri. This section
will outline the different interests
asserted by groups in Missouri.
As history of the Missouri
River reveals, Missouri, like most
lower basin states, has traditionally
asserted flood control and naviga-
tion as its predominant interests.
The proponents of flood control
were, to a large extent, ultimately
satisfied by the passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1944. Although the
Missouri River basin has been dev-
astated by a number of floods since
the closing of the six mainstem
dams, the Corps estimates that
flood-control measures prevented
some $7 billion worth of flood dam-
age between 1937 and 1993.207 At
the time the flood-control projects
were constructed, there were some
questions whether the savings would
ultimately be substantial enough to
justify the costs, but such questions
have now largely been dispelled.
The Corps estimates that in an aver-
age year, flood-control projects pre-
vent approximately $44 million
worth of damage, but the annual cost
of maintaining and operating those
projects amounts to only $4.4 mil-
lion.2 M" In addition, the costs of con-
structing, maintaining, and operat-
ing flood-control projects have been
offset by other benefits conferred by
the system, such as hydropower pro-
duction and recreational opportuni-
ties." In this respect, the Pick-Sloan
Plan has been tremendously success-
ful. 210
In contrast, Missouri's navi-
gation proponents continue to battle
for their interests in Missouri River
management as the constant mini-
mum flows needed to support navi-
gation are continually threatened by
upper basin interests. Navigation
has been the traditional and most
prominent interest asserted by
groups in Missouri, and agricultural
groups have been most notable in
backing those navigation rights.
Missouri's farming interest in navi-
gation dates back to the late 1800s
when railroads were ineffectively
meeting shipping needs for crops (as
detailed previously in the history
section of this Comment) and con-
tinues today. Acting predominantly
on behalf of the agricultural inter-
ests, Missouri's state government
officials and federal legislators have
been, and still are, the biggest voices
in advocating navigation in the in-
terstate and intrastate river manage-
ment disputes.211
While navigation interests
have traditionally been most promi-
206 See, e.g., Tom Uhlenbrock, Missouri River & Fortunes; Focus on a Fish Proposal to Manipulate Level Triggers Eco-
nomic, Environmental Debates, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 2, 1995, at 01A (Missouri Department of Conservation and
Missouri Attorney General's Office at odds over the Corps' proposed management of the river).207 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-62. In 1993, alone, the Corps estimates that flood-control
projects prevented $4.1 billion in damage. Id.
208 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MIsSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE STUDY, DRAFTENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ExEcUTIVE SUNmARY 11 (1994) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]; see also MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6.209 For example, based on the Corps' estimates, average annual hydropower production yields a net benefit of approximately$598 million. See MASTER VANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6 (stating that between 1988 and 1992, the
average annual maintenance and operational costs for power production on the mainstem Missouri River were $22.2 mil-lion); MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS EXECUTIVE SUMeARY, supra note 208, at 13 (stating that "long-term aver-
age hydropower benefits are valued at $620 million per year" on the mainstem Missouri River).
210 See George S. Mickelson, Afy 1eu of the Missouri River, 36 S.D. L. REv. 1, 34 (1991).
211 See, e.g., Scott Canon, Argunent Over River Heats Up, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 13, 1996, at C4 (Governor MelCarnahan and Attorney General Jay Nixon); Judith VandcWater, River Plan All Wet, SayAlissouri Officials, Farmers, ST.Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1994, at OlA (Senators Christopher Bond and John Danforth; Governor Mel Carnahan; andDavid Shorr, then-Director of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources); Julie Anderson, Federal Court Asked toEnsure Longer Barge Season on River, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jul. 31, 1992, at 13SF (Attorney General WilliamWebster). Note, this is not an exhaustive list.
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nently advocated, some Missouri
interest groups have argued for fish
and wildlife and recreational inter-
ests, specifically that the Missouri
River system be managed to produce
wildlife and environmental benefits
and recreational opportunities. As
previously indicated, the Corps is
now required to consider the impacts
of its operations on the environment
and wildlife by virtue of federal laws
like NEPA and ESA. Environmen-
tal groups as well as state and fcd-
eral agencies have urged the Corps
to reevaluate its operations, giving
greater consideration to the welfare
of wildlife and the environment.
Some of these groups promote that
the river be managed in a manner
that would recreate the river's his-
torical, natural hydrograph, particu-
larly with regard to recreating the
"spring pulse" that naturally accom-
panied spring rain and snow-melt
runoff.2 12 Biologists believe these
spring rises create essential habitat
for fish spawning and foraging.'
Ideally, the elevated water levels
would cover some portion of the
flood plain and facilitate a nutrient
exchange between the flood waters
and the soil of the flood plain. Pro-
posals to restore the spring pulse
have met with controversy because
many people believe the existing
levees would restrict the spring pulse
to a narrow, deep course and com-
promise the benefits historically pro-
duced. Furthermore, opponents
contend that management of the
river for a spring pulse could detri-
mentally impact upper basin reser-
voir levels as well as reduce the vol-
ume of water available for lower
basin navigation during the drier
summer months.
Many environmental
groups and government agencies
would also like to restore the river,
to some extent at least, to its pre-
channelization state, with a complex
of backwaters, chutes, sloughs, ox-
bows, sandbars, and islands.'
Where they exist, these areas, which
were once abundant along the en-
tirety of the Missouri River, provide
unique wetland and riparian habitat
for various aquatic and non-aquatic
plant and animal species. Propo-
nents assert that these areas provide
flood-control (e.g., acting as a hori-
zontal buffer zone for flood waters)
and sediment-trapping benefits and
help to decelerate the rate of degra-
dation of the channel.215 Channel
degradation is the lowering of the
river's bed via erosive forces and is
responsible for lowering the river's
water levels and the flood plain's
water table.21 6 This, in turn, reduces
wetland and riparian habitat.2 1  In
general, advocates of environmen-
tal restoration along the river believe
such restoration and development
will create additional recreational
opportunities, enhance the value of
fish and wildlife resources, and re-
store to the river more intangible
values, such as aesthetics.
Relatively minor players in
the intrastate dispute over river man-
agement, and the last to be exam-
ined in this section, include those
groups interested in domestic and
industrial water supply. This is an
important issue because the Missouri
River supplies many Missouri com-
munities with their domestic and
industrial water needs. 2 18 As yet,
however, those interested in protect-
ing Missouri's water supplies have
not emerged as a major interest
group in the Missouri River dispute
because water supplies have not
been seriously jeopardized by low
flows in the river. The ample sup-
ply of water has resulted, in great
part, from Missouri's highly suc-
cessful advocation of navigation
rights, which generally provides suf-
ficient water flows for both naviga-
tion and domestic and industrial
uses. Nonetheless, if flow in the
Missouri River were ever reduced
to such a degree that Missouri water
supplies were jeopardized, this
group could become a significant
player in both the intrastate and in-
terstate dispute.
While the interstate dispute
continues to rage over management
protocol of the river, Missouri faces
its own intrastate divisions in river
interests. Flood control, a histori-
cal and longtime interest, now fades
in importance among Missouri
groups, as improvements in river
management have, overall, success-
fully curtailed flood damage. Navi-
gation interests, bolstered by a tre-
mendously strong Missouri agricul-
tural lobby, continue to garner fed-
eral, state, and local governmental
support in their efforts to cultivate
river management policy. Interests
supporting the further development
212 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 5-9 to 5-10.
213 See Larry W. Hesse & Gerald E. Mestl, An Alternative Hydrograph for the Missouri River Based on the Precontrol
Condition, 13 N. A. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 360 (1993).
214 See Hesse, supra note 14.
215 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-4 1.
216 See id.; Schneiders, supra note 26, at 348-49.
217 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-41.
218 See Id. at 3-73.
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of wildlife and recreation opportu-
nities face a great foe among navi-
gation groups. Finally, interests fo-
cused on domestic and industrial
water supply have enjoyed benefits,
with little effort, basically on the
coattails of navigation proponents.
The dominant player in Missouri's
intrastate river management dispute
lies with the navigation interests, as
the other groups are not as power-
ful, political, or well organized to
exert as much policy-making force.
Nonetheless, navigation's domi-
nance as Missouri's primary inter-
est is not necessarily indicative of
its actual value to Missouri or of its
importance to the people of Mis-
souri.
V. COMMENT
To begin, it is important to
understand this author's character-
ization of the ultimate goal for man-
agement of the Missouri River: to
develop a multiple-use management
plan that maximizes benefits for the
public at large and as many interest
groups as possible. As evidenced
by the history of dispute among the
states of the Missouri River basin,
this will not be easily accomplished,
if at all. One particularly troubling
aspect of this problem is that differ-
ent management practices generally
yield differential and unequal re-
gional benefits. This is the dilemma
vexing states within the Missouri
River basin. The general perception
among the states is that management
practices that benefit other regions
within the basin necessarily translate
into reduced benefits for themselves.
The net effect of this attitude has
been that none of the parties to the
dispute are focused on maximizing
overall benefits to the basin, which
would require the mainstem system
219 Such proposals are not uncommon.
to be managed to accommodate a
balance of multiple uses and inter-
ests that would produce the greatest
combined return to all interested par-
ties. Although the Corps has at-
tempted to find workable compro-
mises, its primary focus has been on
satisfying various interest groups,
rather than maximizing benefits to
the basin. This approach presents
two problems. First, interest groups
are generally preoccupied with
maximizing benefits for themselves
and fail to adequately calculate or
consider the opportunity costs asso-
ciated with management plans they
promote. Second, those groups ac-
tively advocating their interests do
not represent all the interests in-
volved. In this context, interest
groups are generally associations of
interested individuals who stand to
receive sufficient (and usually con-
centrated) benefits, or those who feel
strongly enough about a particular
issue to organize and participate in
the dispute. As a result, it is unlikely
that the Corps' current approach will
ever maximize benefits to the basin
as a whole. Because the Corps is
vested with primary responsibility
for managing the Missouri River, if
the Corps does not seek to maximize
overall benefits to the basin, it will
never be accomplished.
Even if basin-wide recon-
ciliation is never achieved, the ulti-
mate goal of maximizing benefits
can and should be adopted at the
state level. That is, each basin state
should urge the Corps to implement
a multiple-purpose management
plan that would produce maximum
benefits for its state. To that end,
the State of Missouri should exam-
ine its population's interests in the
Missouri River and assess the ben-
efits associated with each. In this
way, the State could determine
which interests should be promoted
so as to maximize benefits to the
people of Missouri. Ultimately, the
State must encourage the Corps to
adopt a management plan that will
maximize benefits to Missouri.
While it is unrealistic to expect the
Corps to manage the river in a man-
ner that maximizes benefits for Mis-
souri, advocating more valuable in-
terests gives the Corps greater incen-
tive to accommodate at least some
of Missouri's interests. In a sense,
it then becomes a matter of maxi-
mizing Missouri's benefits within
the constraints of the Corps' opera-
tion. By fully considering all the
interests of its people and advanc-
ing a combination of those interests
that would maximize the river's ben-
efits to the state, Missouri would
strengthen its bargaining power in
the interstate dispute. The more
valuable the interests Missouri iden-
tifies and asserts, the stronger its ar-
gument will be.
A true commitment to
maximizing benefits requires that
Missouri go beyond merely accom-
modating all of its competing inter-
ests.219 Individuals with competing
and conflicting interests have con-
currently used the Missouri River for
nearly two centuries, so there can be
no doubt that, to some extent, these
uses may coexist. The issue is not
whether the parties involved can find
ways for their different uses and in-
terests to coexist but how the river
should be managed to maximize
benefits for the people of Missouri.
This cannot be accomplished if less
beneficial uses are accommodated
at the expense of more beneficial
uses. Thus, it is important to com-
pare the actual benefits of different
uses in order to determine which
See, e.g., Bond Introduces River Protection Initiative, Fed. Document Clearing
House, Nov. 10, 1997, available in Westlav, 1997 WL 12104672 (stating that Missouri's conflicting uses of the Missouri
River "are not mutually exclusive" and proposing a program to better accommodate such interests).
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should be encouraged and protected.
Traditionally, the values of different
interests are compared according to
their economic benefits. At present,
however, assessments of economic
benefits of interests in the Missouri
River are, in many respects, inad-
equate.
In addition, it is very diffi-
cult to assess economic values of
interests when, in reality, there may
be none, as is often the case with
interests in natural resources. For
example, many people value or have
an interest in the aesthetics of the
natural world,22 0 but translating aes-
thetic value into economic terms is
impracticable. Unless people have
the opportunity and are willing to
spend money to enjoy a particular
benefit, it has no economic value.
Even so, that does not mean the ben-
efit has no value whatsoever. For
example, there is little doubt that
many people would intrinsically
value the appearance of the Missouri
River as it existed before the Anny
Corps of Engineers endeavored to
channelize it. However, little or no
economic value lay in the appear-
ance of the river as it existed prior
to channelization. That is, people
did not spend substantial sums of
money in order to enjoy the benefit
of its appearance. On the contrary,
the United States spent millions of
dollars to alter it. Little doubt ex-
ists, however, that the river's appear-
ance was, and perhaps still is, valu-
able to people on some level. The
point is simply that not all values
surrounding the Missouri River can
easily be converted into economic
terms. Despite the difficulty of as-
signing price tags to intangible ben-
efits, they are, nonetheless, impor-
tant values to consider when seek-
ing to maximize benefits.
Bearing in mind the concept
of maximizing benefits to the state,
as hereinabove described,
Missouri's predominant and
longstanding devotion to navigation
as its primary interest deserves re-
consideration. Although navigation
on the Missouri River has undoubt-
edly benefited Missouri, the extent
of its benefit is debatable. Advoca-
tion of navigation made sense in the
late 1800s and early 1900s when
railroads were the only real alterna-
tive for transportation of bulk goods.
At the time, railroads were not only
monopolistic, they were unable to
transport the quantities of goods re-
quired of them. Today, however,
railroads are not the only alternative
form of transportation; transporting
goods via tractor-trailer is now com-
monplace. Granted that long-dis-
tance, tractor-trailer transport is nei-
ther the most economical nor the
most suitable forn of transportation
for many goods, it is important to
realize that die entire system of trans-
portation is different today. That is,
despite the shortcomings of long-
distance, tractor-trailer transport,
such transport is necessary to some
extent. For example, trucks and trac-
tor-trailers often transport goods not
to their ultimate destination, but to
an intermediate destination at which
the goods are transferred to a more
economical form of long-distance
transport, such as railroads or river
barges. Missouri asserts that barge
traffic on the Missouri River is es-
sential to its agricultural interests,
but the persuasiveness of this asser-
tion is diminished by the fact that
Missouri enjoys the benefits of navi-
gation on the Mississippi River as
well. It is entirely conceivable that
many goods currently transported on
the Missouri could, instead, be trans-
ported by tractor-trailer or train to
the Mississippi River where the
goods could then be transferred to
barges. Of all the lower basin states
that enjoy benefits of navigation on
the Missouri River, Missouri (along
with Iowa) seems to be in the weak-
est position to so strongly assert in-
terest in Missouri River navigation
because of the availability of navi-
gation on the Mississippi River.
Another factor abating
Missouri's continued assertion of the
importance of navigation is the fact
that not all goods are destined for
locales which can be reached by
river. Thus, it is necessary that other
modes of transportation be em-
ployed, and, in fact, other forms of
transportation are already being uti-
lized.22 1 This fact also weakens the
argument that navigation is essential
to transportation of goods to or from
the State of Missouri. A reduction
in navigation would simply require
that some of the goods currently
transported by river be shifted to
other forms of transportation.
Some proponents of navi-
gation argue that the navigation in-
dustry is of great economic impor-
tance to Missouri, and, if the indus-
try were weakened or eliminated,
Missouri would lose jobs and expe-
rience higher transportation costs as
well as sacrifice other economic
benefits.222 Based on the Corps' es-
timates of the value of navigation on
the Missouri River, this seems un-
220 See John L. Funk & C.E. Ruhr, Streamt Channelization in the Alidiwest, STREAM CHANNELIZATION: A SYMosiuM 5, 6
(1971).
221 See, e.g., Michael Mansur, Concern Voiced for River, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al (manager of the
American Commercial Marine Service Company terminal in Omaha admitting that "his company now ships by truck and rail
as wvell as the river").
222 See MissouRi DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF MO. -COLUMBlA, THE IMPACT TO MIssouRi AGRICULTURE OF REDUCED WATERFLOW
ON ulE MIsSOURI RIVER (1991) thCreinafter MissouI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF MO.].
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likely, but, even if true, such nega-
tive impacts would be mitigated in
several ways. First, shifting
Missouri's shipping needs to alter-
native forms of transportation would
create new jobs, displacing those
lost in the navigation industry.
Moreover, if other economic-ben-
efit-producing interests were pro-
moted above navigation, they would
almost undoubtedly create new jobs
as well. Second, the navigation in-
dustry would continue to operate
along the Mississippi River, provid-
ing river transportation for goods
and opportunities for employment
in the industry. Finally, this Com-
ment does not suggest that naviga-
tion should necessarily be eliminated
along the Missouri River. In fact,
as previously discussed, the Corps
of Engineers, presumably, cannot
manage the river to the exclusion of
any of the hereinbefore-mentioned
purposes, including navigation.223
But to the extent more beneficial
uses are presently sacrificed in or-
der to accommodate navigation,
Missouri should seek to promote the
more valuable uses and accept any
consequent reduction in navigation.
In essence, Congressional
funding of -navigational projects is
a subsidy to navigational and agri-
cultural interests, as evidenced by
the agricultural industry's tremen-
dous support for navigational inter-
ests. 2 24 For each year during the five-
year period of 1988 to 1992, the
Corps estimated that $7.1 million
was spent to maintain navigational
improvements on the Missouri
River.225 But the subsidy to naviga-
tional and agricultural interests ac-
tually has a greater price than the
$7.1 million spent per annum to
maintain navigation. Proponents of
navigation fail to accurately calcu-
late the opportunity cost of naviga-
tion, which includes not only the
amount spent to support navigation
but the value of any benefits fore-
gone as a result of accommodating
navigation. Thus, to accurately as-
sess the costs of navigation, one
must add to the $7.1 million spent
each year to operate and maintain
the river for navigation the value of
lost wildlife habitat, associated de-
creases in fish and wildlife benefits,
decreased recreational opportunities,
as well as reductions in intangible
benefits (e.g., aesthetics), the values
of which, as already discussed, may
be difficult to assess. It is this
author's opinion that, if a realistic
opportunity cost were calculated, the
price would far outweigh the ben-
efits of navigation on the Missouri
River, even within Missouri.
Navigation on the Missouri
River peaked in 1977, at approxi-
mately 3.3 million tons of commerce,
after which it declined and leveled
out at about half that rate, at approxi-
mately 1.5 million tons of commerce,
where it still remains.22 6 The Corps
of Engineers now estimates that
navigation on the Missouri River is
an $18 -million-a-year industry. 27
No increase in navigational revenues
is presently anticipated, 2 28 and the
Corps estimates that Missouri is cur-
rently receiving maximum attainable
economic benefits from navigation
with $6.2 million in revenues per
year.2 29 The Corps estimates maxi-
mum attainable economic values as
those benefits that can be achieved
for a specific use by varying the
operation and management of the
river system under present condi-
tions. As a general matter, this au-
thor does not find the Corps' "maxi-
mums," which it estimates for navi-
gation, flood control, hydropower,
recreation, and water supplies in its
Master Manual Review and Up-
date,23 0 particularly compelling be-
cause they are based on the current
conditions of the system and not on
what might be achieved with new
or additional planning and develop-
ment. In this respect, navigation
certainly has an advantage in the
calculation of maximum attainable
economic benefits. For well over
100 years, navigation has consis-
tently been one of the driving pur-
poses for development of the Mis-
souri River basin, and virtually the
entirety of the mainstem river has
been altered in some way to ad-
vance it. These improvements have
223 Note, however, that prohibiting the Corps from managing the river to the exclusion of navigation does not ensure that
navigation could or would remain a viable industry if Missouri and the Corps shifted their focus from navigation to otherinterests. Even so, the most valuable interest or set of interests ultimately should prevail. This, of course, requires thatMissouri know which uses and interests would ultimately be the most valuable.
224 See, e.g., MIssouRi DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF MO., supra note 222.
225 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6.
226 Michael Mansur, IWorking on the River, THE KAN. CITY STAR, May 19, 1997, at Al.227 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS EXECUTIVE Su{mmy, supra note 208, at 16.
228 Ann Toner, Tide of Uncertainty: Barges on Missouri Cling to Role, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1(quoting economist at University of Nebraska-Lincoln as stating "I see nothing but diminished needs for barge transporta-
tion on the Missouri [River]").




made the Missouri River as favor-
able to navigation as it can be made,
short only, perhaps, of constructing
a system of locks and dams as ex-
ists on the Mississippi River above
St. Louis. These factors certainly
affect estimation of the maximum
attainable economic values for navi-
gation on the river and can be some-
what misleading.
In 1991, the Missouri De-
partment of Agriculture and Univer-
sity of Missouri-Columbia conducted
a study in which they attempted to
assess the impacts of a complete loss
of Missouri River navigation on
Missouri's agricultural interests .21
This study estimated the value of
Missouri River navigation for Mis-
souri to be much higher than the
Corps' estimates, citing losses of
over $100 million if navigation were
totally eliminated.232 The study has
been sharply criticized by C. Phillip
Baumel, an economist at Iowa State
University. 23 3 It fails to offer any
support for its assumptions and ad-
mittedly projects a "worst-case sce-
nario." 234 Mr. Baumel points out
that, in the calculations, the study
fails to follow its own, "unrealistic
and naive" assumptions regarding
the impact of eliminating navigation
on costs of shipping by truck and
train. 235 Consequently, the signifi-
cance of this study's findings is ques-
tionable.
In comparison, the Corps
has estimated that the federal gov-
ernment spends approximately $6.1
million each year for purposes of
recreation along the entire Missouri
River.2 36 As with calculating the
amount spent on navigation, the
amount spent for recreation pur-
poses should likewise be adjusted to
reflect the opportunity cost of pro-
moting recreation. Unlike naviga-
tion, however, the overall benefits
realized from recreation (which
should include values of intangibles
and other interests that are enhanced
as a result of promoting recreation,
even though the Corps' estimates do
not) are much more likely to indi-
cate a net benefit, even if a true op-
portunity cost were calculated. The
Corps has estimated that recreation
on the Missouri River generates
some $76 million per year along the
entire river.237 Others have esti-
mated the value of recreation on the
entire Missouri River to be much
higher, at approximately $300 million
per year.2 38 As already mentioned,
neither of these estimates includes
valuations of fish and wildlife and in-
tangible benefits. 239 Nevertheless,
comparing the estimated recreation
benefits with the Corps' estimated
$18 million navigation benefits, the
gap appears substantial. Based on
assessments like the Missouri De-
partment of Agriculture/University
of Missouri study cited previously,
many might argue that the Corps has
grossly underestimated the value of
navigation. Even ifthis is true, it can
also be argued that the Corps has
underestimated the value of recre-
ation as well. The disparity between
the Corps' estimates of recreation
and navigation economic values most
likely reflects an actual disparity in
the value of those uses for two rea-
sons. First, the Corps has generally
been pro-navigation, 240 and, as a re-
sult, there is very little reason to be-
lieve it would now undervalue navi-
gation. Second, the Corps' valua-
231 MIssOURI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV.
232 Id. at 12-13.
OF MO., supra note 222.
233 See Julie Anderson, Missouri Flow Plan CouldHurt Shipping, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 19, 1994, at 9SF; Scott
Canon, A River Transforned?, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al; ISUScholar Disputes Reports on Missouri River
Flows, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 6. 1991, at 20; Larry Fruhling, Expert: Missouri River Used Little for Shipping
Grain, THE DES MOINEs REG., Nov. 6, 1991, at 8. Moreover, then-Missouri Attorney General William Webster, himself,
conceded that "because the report was prepared by downstream interests, it does not come from the most objective
sources." Scott Canon, Upstream Drought Feared, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 27, 1992, at A16.
234 MIssOuRI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF Mo., supra note 222, at 5.
235 See ISU Scholar Disputes Reports on Missouri River Flowvs, supra note 233, at 20. The study asserts that costs of
shipping by truck or train would double in the event navigation were eliminated. Id. Mr. Baumel asserts that in the
calculations, the University actually tripled those costs. Id.
236 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6. It is unknown how much individual states spend
annually for purposes of recreation on the Missouri River.
237 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 15.
238 Julie Anderson, Group Criticizes Navigation Role, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 16, 1997, at 19SF.
239 The Corps has not attempted to estimate the value of fish and wildlife benefits on the Missouri River even though fish
and wildlife is one of the purposes for which the mainstem system is to be operated. Presumably, the Corps' failure to assess
such a value is due to the difficulty of doing so.
240 This is evidenced by the fact that, since the late 1800s, the Corps has repeatedly encouraged Congress to authorize river
improvements for purposes of navigation.
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tions of recreation and navigation
were both calculated during its re-
cent review of the Master Manual.
Consequently, it may be inferred that
the valuations were derived in a simi-
lar manner, and, if one is underesti-
mated, then the other is likely to be
as well. The net result is that,
whether or not the two valuations
are accurate, the disparity between
the two estimates most likely re-
flects an actual difference in values.
Assuming the discrepancy
is real, and there is no reason not to
do so, it is obvious that recreation is
already a much larger industry on
the Missouri River than navigation.
Although most of the recreational
benefits are enjoyed by upper basin
states as a result of the reservoirs, 24 1
it is reasonable to believe that if Mis-
souri worked to more fully develop
recreational opportunities on the
Missouri River, as well as to enhance
fish and wildlife habitat and to in-
crease intangible benefits, it could
realize benefits far exceeding those
it presently realizes. An example of
this potential is evident in the recre-
ation benefits enjoyed by Iowa,
where recreation generates approxi-
mately $4 million per year.24 2 It is
noteworthy that the river travels a
longer distance through Missouri
than Iowa, and neither state boasts
a mainstem reservoir.
The Corps estimates that
Missouri is currently receiving
"maximum" benefits from recre-
ation on the Missouri River, with re-
ceipts of approximately $2.5 million
each year.2 43 Unlike navigation,
however, recreation has not been
well-developed on the Missouri
River in Missouri, which depresses
the estimates of recreation's maxi-
mum attainable economic values for
Missouri. This author believes there
is a great potential for planning and
developing new recreational oppor-
tunities along the river which would
increase the "maximum" benefits
obtainable from recreation. State
and federal agencies have, in fact,
worked to develop some recre-
ational opportunities along the river
in Missouri, although not exten-
sively.244 Such efforts will increase
the maximum attainable economic
benefits from recreation and should
be encouraged to the extent they will
maximize benefits for Missouri.
If Missouri were to adopt a
goal of maximizing overall benefits
to the state, it would not necessarily
mean that navigational and agricul-
tural interests would be abandoned.
There is no reason to believe that, in
order to maximize benefits, naviga-
tion should or must be eliminated
from the Missouri River, but, if navi-
gation is not among Missouri's most
valuable interests in the river, the
state should not continue to revere
and assert navigation as its primary
interest in the river. Moreover, since
the navigation maintenance costs are
an indirect subsidization of agricul-
tural interests, it is conceivable that
the federal government could directly
subsidize agricultural interests and
allow the river to be used for other,
more beneficial purposes, such as
recreation and fish and wildlife. Such
an approach would enable Missouri
to realize greater benefits and to
mitigate any harmful effects a re-




The Missouri River has
played an important, albeit frequently
divisive, role in the history of our
nation. Its vast water resources
have provided extensive benefits to
the people of the Missouri River
basin, but they have also been a
source of contention among the ba-
sin states. Since the 1940s, the Mis-
souri River basin states have been
embroiled in a dispute over the
Corps of Engineers' management of
the Missouri River. In the dispute,
each state has sought to protect and
promote interests in the river that are
important to its residents. Fre-
quently, however, the interests of the
people within each state are, them-
selves, in conflict. This has resulted
in the outbreak of intrastate disputes
in which opposing interest groups
within each state battle for predomi-
nance. The State of Missouri has
experienced the same domestic
struggles.
In the interstate dispute,
Missouri has traditionally asserted
navigation and flood control as its
primary interests. These interests
have enjoyed strong political support
from Missouri's state government
and federally elected legislators.
While flood-control advocates were
largely satisfied with the passage of
the Flood Control Act of 1944, navi-
gation interests have had to continue
battling upper basin states for steady,
24' Approximately two-thirds of the estimated $76 million of recreational benefits realized throughout the Missouri Riverbasin each year are realized by upper basin states. MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-79.242 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS ExEcuTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 54.243 id
244 See, e.g., BigMuddyNot Big Enough, US Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 2, 1997, at 08E (discussing the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's Big Muddy National Refuge); Jerome B. Robinson, Urban Oasis: Searchingfora Unique Solution toa Conmnon Environmental Problem, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1, 1995, at 28 (discussing the Missouri Department ofConservation's Eagle Bluffs Conservation Area).
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minimum flows in the Missouri River
and the longest possible navigation
season. Other, less-powerful and -
influential interest groups in Missouri
include proponents of recreation, fish
and wildlife, and water supplies.
These groups continue to advocate
their interests, although not to the
same extent as navigation propo-
nents.
Recently, the Corps of En-
gineers began reviewing and recon-
sidering its management practices
regarding the Missouri River. This
review has given states and interest
groups a unique opportunity to influ-
ence the Corps' management of the
river. The period of review is also a
good time for state leaders to re-
evaluate the interests of their people
and to consider whether they are ad-
vancing the most appropriate inter-
est or interests on behalf of their citi-
zens. To that end,-Missouri should
endeavor to inventory the interests
of its people, weigh and compare the
relative values of the interests, and
determine which interests it should
advocate in the interstate dispute.
The state government and elected
state and federal officials, as public
servants and representatives of the
people, have an obligation to act on
behalf of the people of Missouri, and,
in so doing, to advocate and protect
the best interests of the people. Thus,
after identifying all of the state's in-
terests and ascertaining their rela-
tive values, the state should urge the
Corps to manage the river in such a
manner as will promote a combina-
tion of Missouri's interests and pro-
duce maximal benefits to the people
of Missouri.
Admittedly, the notion of
maximizing benefits for all of
Missouri's people with regard to the
management and utilization of the
Missouri River is theoretical and ide-
alistic. It would require that
Missouri's political leaders escape
political, interest-group, budgetary,
and other pressures in order to ob-
jectively weigh and balance the
state's various interests in the Mis-
souri River. However unlikely this
may be, seeking to maximize ben-
efits for Missouri on the Missouri
River is, nonetheless, a worthwhile
goal. As a state, Missouri should be
committed to advancing policies and
interests that, if implemented, would
secure the greatest possible benefits
for all its people. If Missouri's
elected officials are incapable of
objectively assessing the benefits of
the state's various interests in the
Missouri River, then the state should
employ independent means in order
to do so. In fact, Missouri should
consider taking a number of actions
to better ascertain, assess, and ad-
vocate the interests of its people.
Missouri should (1) conduct studies
to determine the public's attitudes
toward and opinions regarding the
use and management of the Missouri
River; (2) conduct studies to more
accurately assess the values of
Missouri's different interests, includ-
ing any non-economic values of the
interests; (3) conduct studies to de-
termine realistic opportunity costs
associated with pursuing each inter-
est; (4) strive for objectivity and
avoid political pressures in identify-
ing and assessing the different in-
terests; (5) disregard history and tra-
dition to the extent they interfere with
objectivity; and (6) focus on the best
interests of all of the state's people.
While this Comment has
focused on the activities of
Missouri's state government and
political leaders, it is important to
realize that this issue is not solely the
government's burden. Private par-
ties, too, should take action. Per-
sons with any interest in the Mis-
souri River, whether navigation,
wildlife, recreation, or otherwise,
should seek to organize and partici-
pate in the intrastate debate, if not
the interstate debate. At minimum,
such parties should offer their opin-
ions to their elected officials. Such
officials can respond to public senti-
ment only if they are aware of what
public sentiment is. In addition, pri-
vate parties should consider con-
ducting the same types of studies
proposed above. So long as the
party's objectivity is preserved, the
studies are no less valid. In the al-
ternative, private parties could em-
ploy independent groups to conduct
the studies.
Although realistic assess-
ments of costs and benefits are not
available, this author is persuaded by
the success of other basin states that
if Missouri and the federal govern-
ment would dedicate as many re-
sources to developing recreational
opportunities, fish and wildlife habi-
tat, and intangible benefits on the
Missouri River as have been dedi-
cated to developing and maintaining
the navigation channel over the past
several decades, the recreation,
wildlife, and intangible benefits would
far outweigh the navigation be'nefits
Missouri has heretofore enjoyed.
Subsequent to the development of
the mainstem dam and reservoir sys-
tem, the upper basin states gained
an extremely profitable recreational
resource in the Missouri River.
Those states have tapped and -prof-
ited from the Missouri River's rec-
reational potential, and Missouri can
learn a valuable lesson from them.
While the Missouri River in Missouri
lacks the recreational draw of res-
ervoirs, it does possess appreciable
recreational potential along its
mainstem, and, if the river were
properly developed and aggressively
marketed and promoted, recreation
along the river could yield substan-
tial economic benefits. Iowa appears
to demonstrate this concept, even on
a shorter length of the Missouri River
MELPR 141
VoI. 5 + No. 3
than runs through Missouri. It is im-
portant to stress that promotion of
recreation, fish and wildlife, and in-
tangible benefits does not, by itself,
require exclusion ofnavigation from
Missouri's plans for river manage-
ment. Advocating that Missouri as-
sert more-beneficial interests over
less-beneficial interests, as discussed
in this Comment, certainly does not
necessitate that one interest be pro-
moted to the exclusion of any other.
Rather, Missouri simply should seek
to allocate resources to generate the
maximum possible benefits to the
people of this state.
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